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W orking M od els  of Perception;  
F ive G eneral Issues
W illem  J .M .  Levelt*
1 In troduction
There are, at least, two kinds of scientific meetings. The first, homogeneous, 
kind brings together people from the same discipline who work on closely 
related problems, and hope to jointly clarify one or two of them. The sec­
ond, heterogeneous, kind collects scientists from different backgrounds on a 
fairly global theme, and the intention is one of mutual instruction and gen­
eral enrichment. Both types of meetings have their specific problems. The 
homogeneous meeting, often called a ‘workshop’, carries the risk of being 
utterly boring, because all participants already know beforehand the songs 
of most of their colleagues. The heterogeneous meeting, often called a ‘sym­
posium’ in memory of Greek drinking-bouts where one indulged in more or 
less decent talk and rhetoric, risks being too difficult or too superficial. It is 
often hard to follow a serious detailed paper from another discipline; when 
this leads to making major concessions, one may end up in the shallow table 
talk which lent its name to this kind of meeting.
Our present symposium was clearly tilted to being of this latter hetero­
geneous type. A collection of physicists, engineers, psychologists, computer 
scientists, linguists, logicians and phoneticians addressed issues of human 
perception from their often wildly different perspectives. As Dutch idiom 
has it, we have been balancing on the sharp of the edge. We were, on the 
one hand, treated to glimpses of exciting new developments in basic and 
applied perception research. Time and again I regretted not being more of 
an insider, so as to be able to share the full excitement of discovery and 
argumentation. And indeed there were occasional moments where I had 
not the faintest idea what was at issue. But by and large the excitement- 
surpassed the frustration. On the other hand, we have had our moments 
of table talk. Superficial maybe, but not less pleasant. It contributed to 
creating the comfortable illusion that human perception is one, and that we
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have all been chosen to participate in its mystery.
My present task is, I fear, to contribute some more to this latter illusion.
1 am supposed to elaborate where we are one already, and to highlight some 
of the remaining obstacles on the twisting road to unity. In short, I must 
address some general issues in perception. I have accepted this task in full 
awareness of threatening shallowness; but the inevitable liturgy of rounding 
up a conference will hopefully raise your tolerance level.
I intend to address the following five general issues. The first one is: How 
do models of perception handle convergence in real time? The second one 
is: How, in models of perception, are structure and function determining 
of process? The third issue is: What is the learnability status of models 
of perception? The fourth one is: What is the role of input management 
in perception? And the last issue is: What is general and what is specific 
in perceptual architecture? The exercise will mainly consist of raising and 
elaborating the questions. I felt that, even after this successful meeting, 
we should leave with the feeling that there are still some questions to be 
answered.
2 Issue 1: H ow  do m odels o f p ercep tion  handle  
convergence in real tim e?
The ability to converge is a litmus test for any model of perception. A 
general paraphrase of this ability is: Given context and well-formed input, 
the model should converge on the ecologically correct solution. And if it 
does, the mediating processes should be able to run in real time on the 
neural issues involved. If a model fails to live up to these criteria there is 
something seriously lacking. Elsewhere (Levelt and Flores d ’Arcais, 1987; 
Levelt and Schriefers, 1987) I have argued that all existing models of lexical 
access, including logogen theory and cohort theory, fail on this criterion. 
They cannot guarantee that, given the stimulus, the correct word identifica­
tion is going to be made. Cohen, in his introductory lecture, acknowledged 
the dawning awareness of this problem among speech researchers when he 
reviewed the change of terminology from optimistic ‘speech analysis’ via 
‘speech recognition’ and ‘speech understanding’ to all-encompassing ‘speech 
interpretation’.
Probably the most explicit effort to implement the convergence criterion 
we have seen during this conference was Rosenbloom’s SOAR model. SOAR  
is built in such a way that, i f  it comes up with a solution, it comes up with
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the correct solution. The learning errors that it still makes occasionally are 
to be avoided in better versions of the model. The approach is extremely 
conservative, in that the power of SOAR increases from version to version, 
without ever relaxing this correctness criterion. At the same time, the au­
thors are highly aware of the real-time issue. It may not be so hard to 
come up with the correct solution given sheer infinite processing time, but 
it becomes very hard to approach the speed of human processing without 
blocking or coming up with an erroneous result. Two features in the model 
are material in approaching realistic temporal parameters. The first one 
is parallel processing, the simultaneous elaboration of different goals on a 
stack. The second one, Rosenbloom’s warranty of quality, is chunking. Pre­
viously elaborate, but successful trains of productions are chunked together 
to be available for application at one swoop. It is precisely this feature 
which makes SOAR relevant for the study of perception. Most definitions of 
perception acknowledge its character of immediacy, as opposed to problem 
solving where there is often awareness of effortful steps and intermediary re­
sults. But skilled problem solving does have perceptual features, as De Groot 
(1946) argued long ago when he discussed the skillful perception of configu­
rations in chess. It is this kind of high-speed perceptual process which gets 
modelled by chunking. And Bosser, in his reaction to Rosenbloom’s paper, 
was right in stressing that this should be an obvious extension of SOAR.
One of the most serious problems in meeting the criterion of convergence 
is the interaction of stimulus and context, and for which Cohen reintroduced 
Wundt’s good old term apperception. We have seen several cases of this 
during the conference. Nooteboom, for one, presented the case of voice 
quality, which is -  in part -  determined by the correct perceptual assignment 
of perceptual noise to voice. But if the speech is not coded in the right 
way, the perceptual system throws out that noise as annoying ‘context’, 
instead of taking it as a feature of voice quality. Anstis showed how the 
same visual stimulus could be interpreted one way or another, dependent 
on various kinds of context. He demonstrated convincingly that a model 
of motion perception will not uniquely converge, given a stimulus, without 
specifying such contextual conditions as the gradients of luminance change 
and the amount of surrounding dynamic noise. Juola correctly stressed 
that the global context effects demonstrated by Anstis cannot be explained 
by the existing models. Something extra is needed. Houtsma suggested 
that this extra is probably quite central, because the ear shows the same 
type of context effects. This was an elegant non-sequitur, quite relevant for 
the fifth issue discussed in this paper. In some of his published articles,
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Anstis has shown that motion interpretation also depends on the pattern 
of neighbouring motions, and even on the interpretation of the patterns 
involved as real objects. The latter finding is particularly upsetting, because 
the pattern’s constitution as an object may itself be a consequence of the 
induced apparent motion. A working model should tell us what is chicken 
and what is egg.
Leeuwenberg approached the context problem in a totally different and 
quite principled way. He declared visual context to be part of the stimulus. 
The simplicity of coding the whole lot determines the percept. The notion 
of ‘likely interpretation’ is no more than a derived one. It seems to me 
that Leeuwenberg’s coding theory may in this way handle some of Anstis’ 
published cases correctly, i.e. by just using the precisely defined simplicity 
criterion, convergence will be perfect. On this view, a perceptual system is 
a purely syntactical machine which delivers its solution irrespective of world 
knowledge, circumstantial likelihood, or what have you.
I am still very sympathetic to this view, in spite of Sutherland’s eloquent 
reintroduction of the likelihood principle. Of course, he was right to indi­
cate that simplicity should always be seen in relation to a notation system. 
But Leeuwenberg’s notation system is by no means an arbitrary one. It 
was precisely designed to capture major regularities in perceptual encod­
ing. The view of the perceptual system as a syntactic machine is akin to 
Fodor’s modularity notion: Input systems are reflex-like working modules, 
whose functioning cannot be affected by other processors. On that view, 
they are in particular impenetrable to the perceiver’s convictions, beliefs, 
or intentions. The main problem with this notion is to come up with the 
correct definition of the system ’s output. What kind or level of represen­
tation is computed by this modular syntactic machine? When I see a face 
and immediately recognize it as Herman Bouma’s, what was the module’s 
part in this? Was its output a bunch of overlapping and connected surfaces 
with their textures and colors? Or was it already a 3-D interpretation? Or 
was it a mapping onto the perceiver’s stored Herman-template? The latter 
Leeuwenberg surely wouldn’t like. In fact, it has been suggested that the 
visual module’s output is a kind of 2.5-D representation in Marr’s sense. 
This comes reasonably close to Leeuwenberg’s coding, although the theory 
is very different in other respects.
Assuming that such questions can be answered, the convergence prob­
lem takes a different shape. Phenomenologically speaking, the perceiver 
converges on ‘Herman’s face’, not on some uninterpreted 2.5-D representa­
tion. It is not at all despicable for a perceptuologist to try and account for
Working models o f perception; Five general issues 493
phenomenological convergence, the perceiver’s own full interpretation of the 
scene. Sutherland correctly stressed that the task for visual perception is 
to recognize objects, with their shape, size, and distance properties. When 
it is assumed, for the moment, that some version of modularity is correct, 
there are then two tasks to be faced. The first one is to handle convergence 
in the module, which I will call modular convergence. An algorithm which 
automatically derives a unique and correct Leeuwenberg coding from a scene 
would do a thing like that. The second one is to map that intermediary rep­
resentation onto the perceiver’s final full interpretation, i.e. something like 
‘Herman’s face’. This I will call post-modular convergence. This second step 
may also be highly automatic, but it is not modular. Expectations, beliefs, 
desires, intentions may have their share in the interpretative process. It is 
here that likelihood does matter.
The first kind of ‘modular’ convergence may be hard to attain for a 
model of perception, but the latter kind of ‘post-modular’ convergence is 
even more horrendous. This is because the system leaks like a sieve. It 
is at the mercy of factors such as analogy, recent experience, suggestion, 
emotion, and the motivational system Bosser referred to in his reaction 
to Rosenbloom. It should immediately be added that many do not share 
the distinction between a modular input system, connected to non-modular 
more central interpretative processors. Connectionists are of this kind, and 
so are Gibsonians. Both are optimists as far as convergence is concerned. 
Connectionists live in the paradisical belief that convergence will naturally 
fall out if a simple non-specific learning algorithm is combined with some 
finite sequence of activation of ‘learning’ pairs. Gibsonians tell us that the 
perceptual system has very little to do because the invariance is in the 
stimulus. This enables a one-to-one mapping to the correct interpretation. 
There is no convergence problem.
But alas, both views are naive. I will not return to the connectionists’ 
beliefs, since, honestly to my surprise after Cohen’s (somewhat ambivalent) 
insistence that we consider connectionism, nobody defended those beliefs 
during this meeting. Lindblom did a professional job on the Gibsonians. 
He discussed the hopeless non-convergence of speech perception models. 
And he pointed to the inherent weakness of theories which tacitly or overtly 
assume that the stimulus does contain the relevant information. His example 
stimulus [lesnsevn] is just as ambiguous as some of Anstis’ apparent motion 
stimuli, or the anaphoras Bunt talked about. Only context can disambiguate 
them. If the perceptual model does not incorporate a means of letting 
relevant context have its effect, the model simply fails on the convergence
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criterion. But the comparison with Anstis’ cases of visual ambiguity is 
instructive. There, following Leeuwenberg’s lead, one could conjecture that 
disambiguation or convergence can be handled entirely within the modular 
stage of the model, by taking context to be part of the stimulus. Lindblom’s 
case, however, resists such an approach. The ambiguous stimulus is all 
there is to be heard. The ecologically valid interpretation only results when 
knowledge of the discourse situation is taken into account. Convergence 
must be post-modular, if we stick to that distinction. At any rate, the 
disambiguating information is not part of the immediate perceptual scene.
If the ultimate goal is the ecological validity of a perceptual model, i.e. 
correct convergence in real-life perceptual situations, it is advisable to insert 
a phenomenological stage early in one’s research endeavours. Lindblom an­
nounced doing just that, collecting natural spontaneous speech to find out 
what the ecologically normal stimulus looks like, as opposed to the perfected 
laboratory case. Bunt also based his model of text processing on elaborate 
analyses of natural dialogues. The gain over standard models of text inter­
pretation is enormous, just because these analyses made him aware of the 
necessity to build a powerful pragmatic component into the model. There 
will be no correctly converging text interpretation without letting beliefs 
and intentions have their way.
But let us not become self-congratulatory too quickly. It is one thing 
to be explicitly aware of the context- and knowledge-dependency of conver­
gence, it is quite another thing to create a working model that handles it 
correctly, or at least major aspects of it. Lindblom, for instance, has no 
working model which guarantees convergence. Bunt’s model can surely be 
fooled, as can most other models that we have reviewed these days. This is 
in no way tragic, it just shows that we need research funds for some more 
years to go.
3 Issue 2: H ow , in m odels o f p ercep tion , are  
stru ctu re  and function  d eterm in in g  of process?
Structuralism and functionalism are ill-defined notions, but it is worth con­
sidering the following two approaches to perception. One is to dissect the 
structure of the system (be it anatomically, physiologically, psychologically), 
and predict from there what the system will do, what kind of representation 
it will generate. Let us call structuralism the approach of predicting process 
from architecture. The other is to analyse what goal is served or function is
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performed by the system, and then to conjecture an architecture which can 
compute that function in real time. Let us call functionalism the approach 
of predicting processing architecture from function. These approaches are 
usually intermingled in our scientific minds, and that is how it should be. 
The issue becomes more serious, however, if causative claims are being made. 
Do structures necessarily cause particular perceptual results? Or does the 
processing architecture necessarily adapt to the functional requirements?
Anstis came close to the causative structuralist position when he pre­
dicted that segregation of motion should be a consequence of the existence 
of a neural channel for luminance change. The prediction did not bear out. 
O ’Regan similarly derived necessary perceptual constraints from the grain 
of the retina. But Taylor and Houtsma made clear that structure does not 
necessarily restrict functional resolution that way; it need not in a low-noise 
system, for instance. Also Goldstein came close to the causative structuralist 
position when he suggested that the non-linear nature of cochlear filtering 
should quite likely reflect itself in speech perception. The structural cause is 
there, hence the perceptual effects are to be found. It is interesting to com­
pare this to A tal’s finding that even rather heavy distortions in the speech 
signal, namely in fixed multi-pulse coded speech, have negligible perceptual 
effects. Another such case presented during the conference by Taylor is 
Boum a’s systematic distortion of letter forms in handwriting, which appar­
ently hardly interferes with word recognition. If such heavy distortions in 
the stimulus go unnoticed, why should not non-linear distortions created in 
the peripheral sense organs go unnoticed? Though this may all be obvious 
to functionalists, they have no principled way of predicting which kind of 
sensory distortions will or will not have perceptual effects. The structuralist 
predictions are at least predictions worth testing. They direct our attention 
to potentially interesting phenomena.
Functionalist positions were taken rather more clearly by Rosenbloom 
and by Lindblom. Rosenbloom, working in a Newellian framework, has 
the architecture of his model shaped by the task and by past experience 
with the task. Lindblom introduced the notion of ‘adaptive variability’, the 
adaptation of both production and perception of speech to current functional 
demands -  in fact a frontal attack on the mainstream structuralist practice 
in linguistics.
Lindblom did not hesitate to extend this notion to the explanation of the 
cultural history of languages. Different languages are different solutions to 
the joint optimization of motor effort and perceptual distinctiveness. This 
is, in my view, a highly attractive functionalist notion. Still, not everybody
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will be happy with it. Ohala, for instance, was not because there is no 
real improvement  in language evolution. I also suspect, for instance, that 
it makes Leeuwenberg shudder. He senses circularity in such evolutionary 
explanations, as appeared from his discussion with Sutherland about the 
phylogenetic likelihood of perceptual schemes. According to Leeuwenberg’s 
structuralist point of view, the perceptuologist’s task is to find out what kind 
of representation the system computes, and according to what principles. 
The statement that this is in some way or another a ‘best’ solution cannot 
be falsified. The functionalists, I feel, have a strong point. But they easily 
force themselves into a position where they can only test the null-hypothesis.
The issue of functionalism is closely connected to the issue of learnability. 
Learning is a form of optimization with respect to a certain task or function. 
This brings us to issue 3.
4 Issue 3: W hat is the learnability  sta tu s  of m o d ­
els of perception?
Another litmus test for the adequacy of a perceptual model is that it can be 
acquired in finite time. Some perceptual skills are preprogrammed, being 
ready at birth, or maturing shortly after. Other skills require substantial 
learning. Making certain categorical phonetic distinctions, for instance, is 
to a surprising degree already there right after birth; correctly recognizing 
the words of a language takes years to develop. A working model of per­
ception must be learnable in realistic time. By this I mean that there must 
be a learning algorithm which, given the prewired capacities, the percep­
tual input, and the feedback, produces the working model as output, and 
this algorithm should be consonant with speed of acquisition in the human 
learner. The initial learning algorithm can, of course, only be prewired.
It is still quite unusual for students of perception to bother about learn­
ability. This in spite of the fact that learning plays a crucial role in percep­
tion, as we all agreed during the Sutherland/Leeuwenberg discussion. The 
issue is of great importance for two reasons. The first one is that an unlearn- 
able model is ipso facto unacceptable. If one can show that there is no way 
for the organism to acquire the supposed processing architecture, then that 
model must be wrong. Take as an example Leeuwenberg’s structural infor­
mation theory. It can be considered as a grammar which assigns structural 
descriptions to perceptual patterns. We do not know whether that grammar 
is learnable. Its learnability will, in part, depend on what we assume to be
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innately given as abstract coding schemes. It also depends on the kind of 
feedback we suppose the perceiver receives in the course of acquiring the 
grammar. And its learnability will, last but not least, depend on the gen­
erative power of the grammar. Can we characterize the set of patterns that 
are well-formed in terms of the grammar? A grammar’s power is, in fact, 
the main determinant of its learnability. A similar question can be asked 
with respect to Groenendijk’s Dynamic Logic. If it is indeed the appropriate 
model for the semantics of conversation, than it should be learnable in finite 
time.
The second reason to be concerned with learnability lies in the course of 
perceptual learning; for both theoretical and applied reasons it is important 
to know how a perceptual skill is acquired over time. It is one thing to know 
that acquisition of a model is feasible, it is quite another thing to design the 
learning algorithm. Rosenbloom practically reversed the order of dealing 
with these issues. He designed his chunking as a learning algorithm. The 
resulting processing architecture is then, ipso facto, a learnable one.
That approach will seldom be taken by students of human vision or au­
dition. They first create the model, and only much later, if at all, wonder 
about perceptual learning. The situation is, however, quite different in the 
applied fields. Engineers have long known that image coding can be enor­
mously improved by implementing an acquisition procedure in the system, 
or so I thought. This is relatively easy if the set of patterns to be recognized 
is of a restricted kind, such as the letters of the alphabet, as used in optical 
readers (e.g., in Kurzweil machines). But also automatic speech recognition 
systems that learn, involving far larger sets of stimuli, are now showing their 
market value, and generally the value of learning algorithms in technolog­
ical applications. I was surprised by Kunt’s review of image coding where 
no reference was made to learning algorithms. And also Mussman did not 
mention anything of the sort. Do I overestimate the currency or relevance 
of artificial learning systems? I probably do.
That first morning session on image coding surprised me for other -  but 
still related -  reasons as well. How can an important field of technology so 
substantially ignore existing theories of visual perception? Following up on 
a private exposé Goldstein gave me later that day, we can make a distinction 
between waveform encoding and source encoding. One could be reasonably 
happy with the presented work as far as waveform encoding is concerned. 
One only needs Fechner’s law, delivered over a century ago, or something 
similar. For source encoding, however, one needs a model. For speech encod­
ing the classical model is LPC, a model of the speech producing apparatus.
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Atal showed how this was not good enough, and how it became replaced by 
increasingly sophis t ica ted  perception-based models, such as CELP. For the 
encoding of visual images, one also needs some perception-based model. B u t  
as long as this necessity is vir tually  ignored, the coding will be hopelessly 
sub-op tim al,  as was implied by T ay lo r’s questions during  the discussion. 
A tal  said a t  one m om ent “speech coding and  aud i tory  research go h a n d  in  
h a n d ”. One should wish th a t  a few years from now a m u ta t i s  m u ta n d i s  
s ta te m e n t  can be m ade for visual p a t te rn  coding and visual research. In 
addit ion  -  and this brings us back to the present issue -  the  question of 
learnabili ty  canno t  be professionally addressed w ith o u t  a model,  since w h a t  
is learned is precisely the model.
O the r  applied fields where theories of perceptual  learning are indispensi- 
ble are the education  of the handicapped ,  and h um an-com pu te r  interfacing. 
Fourcin reminded us of the learning problems of the hard  of hearing when 
they w an t  to acquire the phonetic  con tras ts  of their  language. T he  learn­
ability of these con tras ts  by hearing-impaired  children can be unders tood  
from the auditory  p a t te rn  model. It says th a t  all m ajor  phonetic  con tra s ts  
of a language are associated with  fa m i l i e s  of aco u s t ic /au d i to ry  features.  T he  
absence or a t ten u a t io n  of one feature can be com pensa ted  for by the  pres­
ence of ano the r  feature. One m ight say th a t  the family of features  forms 
an equivalence class  w ith  respect to a par t icu la r  phonetic  con tras t .  W ith  
adequa te  tra in ing ,  hearing-impaired  children can acquire a co n tra s t  by using 
acoustic-auditory  features th a t  are still available to them .
During the discussion of this paper,  H o u tsm a  referred to cross-modal 
t ra in ing  program s,  such as the one developed by Povel in Nijmegen, where 
equivalence classes of acoustic features are factored ou t  from the signal and 
m apped  onto  some visual dimension, a different bu t  ‘n a t u r a l ’ one for each 
phonetic  con tras t .
The  im por tance  of models of acquisition for h u m an -co m p u te r  in terfac­
ing needs no extensive a rgum en ts  either. In fact, this kind of learning has 
lately become a p re t ty  active field of research. User-friendliness is a lm ost  
synonym ous with  easy learnability. Here again, a main  issue for learnab il­
ity, as Wright pointed out,  is the ‘n a t u r a l ’ fac torization  of design features.  
‘N a tu r a l ’ being independently  recognizable, ‘chunkab le’, and learnable  by 
the  user.
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5 Issue 4: The m anagem ent of input
When I discussed convergence as a litmus test for the adequacy of a working 
model of perception, I distinguished between ‘modular’ and ‘post-modular’ 
convergence, where modular output is input to a component which can ac­
knowledge context, expectations, motivations, and so forth. But the picture 
has to be complicated even more. In many, if not most perceptual situations 
input is made dependent on expectation, motivation, earlier interpretation, 
etc. Let us first consider the case where this is controlled by the perceiver 
himself. One major example at this symposium was provided by O ’Regan. 
Eye fixation is selection of input, and fixation is by no means a random 
process. Rather, it is in some sense based on expectation. O ’Regan could 
show that the saccades in reading are programmed in such a way that the 
resulting fixation approaches the optimal or convenient viewing position for 
a word, i.e. the position allowing for speediest convergence in word recog­
nition. The expected most convenient position is derived from peripheral 
vision during the previous fixation. Peripheral vision does not allow for the 
computation of the real most convenient viewing condition, because that 
requires, of course, recognition of the word. But, given reading experience 
in the language, a fair guess can be made on the basis of physical properties 
of the word. In the experienced reader this turns into a purely ocular-motor 
response. Taylor suggested that that preferred viewing position is systemat­
ically deviant from the convenient viewing position. O ’Regan could handle 
these discrepancies elegantly. At any rate, if fixation turns out to be too far 
from optimal, local tactics may correct it. There is, in short, an elaborate 
system of input management, optimizing the chances of correct convergence, 
whose crucial component is a feedback loop.
As we all know, not all feedback loops in perception are of a post-modular 
kind, i.e. acknowledging the perceiver’s expectations. The pupil is automat­
ically adjusted to the intensity of the stimulus, and the eye automatically 
follows a moving object. For audition, similar short-circuited feedback loops 
are involved, attenuating the input. One of the exciting moments of this 
conference was Duifhuis’s discussion of the motor-active outer hair cells, an 
input management system which may, in part, account for the non-linearities 
which Goldstein so beautifully modelled. In short, some management of in­
put is already built into the modular parts of our senses.
But non-modular feedback will, in many cases, be a main contributor to 
accurate convergence. Due to the perceiver’s attentional control, a selection 
of potentially relevant input is made. Wright, in her paper, went so far as
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saying that there are explicit strategies of non-selection or evasion, which 
by default optimize the relevant input. She suggested that this is rather 
unexplored theoretical territory in cognitive psychology. But is it really? 
As Bouwhuis pointed out, existing models of goal/action hierarchies are 
relevant here. Rosenbloom’s work shows that this is by no means virgin 
area in psychology.
One would like to know better to what extent the management of input 
affects or is even essential for accurate convergence. Much work in visual 
perception is based on the tacit assumption that input management is irrel­
evant. Leeuwenberg’s theory, for instance, is ignorant of such factors. And 
indeed, it would be very pleasant if major areas of perceptual theory could 
be saved from input management factors. But even for these classical areas 
of perceptual theory there are inconvenient phenomena. Anstis, for instance, 
could show that the direction of apparent motion can depend on where the 
eye fixates. And Juola reminded us of the important fact that no movement 
is seen when the eye is actively moved. No way to account for such phe­
nomena by a structural information theory. The perceiver’s management 
of input is crucial here. And it should be added that input management is 
probably a doubly important factor in the acquisition phase of a perceptual 
skill. How does the learner scan the input? Is there a systematic interaction 
between the developmental state of the perceptual system and the input it 
selects? These are no small questions.
But the problems become even more intractable when the input manage­
ment is not in the hands of the perceiver. This is often the case in speech 
perception. The listener usually has little control over what he wants to 
listen to. It is, rather, prepared for him, and presented in some pre-planned 
order. It is the speaker who is supposed to optimize the input. And this 
optimization affects different levels of the input. Lindblom’s ‘adaptive vari­
ability’ is such an input management strategy. It will, for instance, affect 
the size of the vowel space the listener becomes confronted with, as well as 
the amounts of assimilation and coarticulation he will have to deal with. 
In response, the addressee can exert a certain amount of control by saying 
‘W hat?’, or by asking for more specific repair. Real life speech perception to 
some extent relies on these corrective possibilities. Will a model of speech 
perception ever be complete if these kinds of input management are not 
taken into account? I doubt it.
Similar remarks can be made with respect to text comprehension in gen­
eral. Bunt’s dialogue system has been the most explicit working model of 
mutual input management at this symposium. Given his goal, an inter-
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locutor constructs the next input text on the basis of a running account of 
the state of discourse and the state of dialogue. He systematically directs 
the addressee, usually in a sequence of turns, to come up with the correct 
interpretation of his intention.
In short, there are large areas of perceptual modelling where input man­
agement is or should be a crucial component of the theory if it aims at 
ecological validity.
6 Issue 5: W hat is general and w h a t is specific  
in p ercep tu a l architecture?
The last concern I would ask you to share with me, is the ever-existing 
tension between general and specific explanation in perception. They are 
styles of theorizing which have been with us since Plato and Aristotle and 
from which we will not disentangle ourselves for a long time to come. The 
approach of general explanation involves the statement of general principles 
of perceptual organization, and the assumption of a fairly general processing 
architecture underlying the different perceptual modalities. At this confer­
ence we have seen two typical instances of this approach. Leeuwenberg’s 
structural information theory is to a large extent modality-independent. It 
invokes general principles of perceptual organization, in the same vein els 
Gestalt Psychology used to do. By implication, somewhat less in the fore­
front of the work, it assumes the existence of general processing algorithms 
which will parse perceptual input according to these organizational princi­
ples. The other case is Rosenbloom’s work. Its explicit goal is to create a 
general theory of intelligent behaviour. The basic architecture of the system  
is quite independent of the specific tasks it performs. It is a uniform  architec­
ture. What there is in terms of specificity is acquired through chunking, but 
the principles of chunking are, again, of an entirely general nature. In both 
these cases we have to do with a purposeful generalistic approach. There is 
a genuine belief in the existence of powerful organizational principles of a 
general kind.
Specific explanation is often done by default, not because of a principled 
view on perceptual organization. If one works on a model of the cochlea, as 
Goldstein and Duifhuis do, one is by necessity working on a specific model. 
There are no hair cells in the retina. In Anstis’s work on movement and 
luminance detectors, he is equally creating a specific model. All this is 
obvious and unobjectionable.
502 W.J.M. Levelt
But the search for specific explanation can be as principled as the search 
for general explanation. Proponents of modularity claim that input systems 
are specific. They are specific in the kind of input they accept, they are 
specific in their principles of organization, they are specific in the kind of 
output representations they compute, and they are specific in their patterns 
of break-down. In addition, they are supposed to be implemented in specific 
neural tissue. The architecture of the auditory cortex is entirely different 
from the organization of the visual cortex, according to this view.
Speech perception has an interesting place in this modular picture. It 
comes through the ear, but it is not just auditory perception. It has its 
own principles of organization. There is something like a ‘speech mode’ 
(Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler and Studdert-Kennedy, 1967) which treats 
acoustic input ‘as if it were speech’, i.e. imposing a set of speech-specific 
perceptual categories through which the signal can be mapped onto a phono­
logical code, for instance a word form. A possible parallel case in visual 
perception could be a ‘face mode’, a specific way of dealing with the catego­
rization of faces and of facial expressions. For both the speech mode and the 
face mode the reasonable conjecture has been made that they are subserved 
by specific neural tissues.
The latter two examples should guard us from making the oversimplifi­
cation that input systems are obviously specific, because the sense organs 
are specific. The speech mode and the face mode are post-cochlear and 
post-retinal, respectively. Modularity is, therefore, by no means a trivial 
conjecture.
The tension between general and specific approaches to perception is, in 
my view, a healthy and stimulating one. But it would be too optimistic to 
predict that the dialectics will once resolve itself in a grand synthesis. That 
kind of Utopia is only given to political systems.
7 Epilogue
This completes my five general issues in perception. I began by making 
a distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous scientific meetings. 
We are completing a heterogeneous one, and we should be proud of having 
survived the tensions this created. But let us not forget that the Institute 
for Perception Research IPO has already managed to survive no less than 
30 years of such tension. It is apparently possible for physicists, engineers, 
linguists, psychologists, phoneticians, logicians and computer scientists to
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cooperate peacefully in the study of human perception. IPO has set an 
example hardly matched anywhere in the world. It should be congratulated. 
And I am sure I am expressing the feelings of all of us when I thank the 
Institute, Herman Bouma and his magnificent dedicated team for having 
organized this exciting symposium.
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